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CASE NOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL-
AFFIRMATIVE APPLICATION IN MULTIPLE
LITIGANT SITUATIONS
On November 8, 1965, while attempting to land at the Greater Cin-
cinnati Airport, Covington, Kentucky, an American Airlines' aircraft
crashed, causing the death of fifty-eight of the sixty-two passengers.
Among the deceased were Bruce F. Hart, a resident of New York, and
Sammual Creasy of Texas. An action in behalf of Hart's estate was
commenced in New York County alleging that the crash and resulting
deaths were caused by American Airlines' negligent operation of the
aircraft during the landing approach. Subsequently, an action involv-
ing the death of Creasy was commenced in the United States District
Court in Texas. As in the New York case, the plaintiff in Texas alleged
that the crash was due to American Airlines' negligence., The Creasy
case, brought under the Kentucky Wrongful Death Statute, 2 was the first
cause of action to be tried to conclusion. After a nineteen-day trial, the
jury found American Airlines liable for Creasy's death.8 In light of the
Texas decision, the plaintiff in New York moved for a summary judg-
ment on the issue of American Airlines' negligence. The motion was
denied.4 On appeal, the judgment was reversed and summary judgment
was granted to the plaintiff on the ground that under the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel the Texas court's determination of negligence was con-
clusive on the issue of the airline's liability for the crash, notwithstanding
the fact that the plaintiff was not a party to the Texas law suit. Hart v.
American Airlines, Inc., 304 N.Y.S.2d 810, 61 Misc. 2d 41 (1969).
The significance of this decision is that it represents the first time a state
jurisdiction has allowed the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be affirma-
tively applied in a multiple litigant situation, by a person neither a party
to, nor deriving rights from a party to a previous law suit. The purpose
1. Creasy v. American Airlines, Inc. and the United States of America, 418 F.2d
180 (5th Cir. 1969).
2. Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.130 (1962).
3. Brief for Appellant at 3, Hart v. American Airlines, Inc., 304 N.Y.S.2d
810, 61 Misc. 2d 41 (1969).
4. Id. at 4.
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of this casenote is twofold: to examine the evolution of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel from its traditional restrictions to its broadened ap-
plication in recent decisions; and to evaluate the effect of the Hart rule
in multiple litigant proceedings.
Collateral estoppel,5 in traditional terms, is a doctrine under which a
party to a lawsuit is estopped from asserting or denying a given issue of
law or fact because the question has been determined in a previous law-
suit in which the estopped party, or someone in privity with him, was a
participant.' The traditional definition of collateral estoppel also re-
quires that "mutuality of estoppel" exist. Mutuality prohibits a party to
a lawsuit from taking advantage of a previous judgment unless he would
also be bound by that judgment. 7 The legal rationale supporting this
doctrine is that a party to an action should risk the loss of rights, or the
creation of liabilities, only with reference to his adversaries in that particular
5. The development of the doctrine of collateral estoppel has not been as rapid
as otherwise possible because of the failure of judges and courts to distinguish col-
lateral estoppel from res judicata. See generally Developments in the Law-Res
Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818 (1952). As an example of the confusion that oc-
curs, see W.E. Hedger Transp. Corp. v. Ira S. Bushy & Sons, 92 F. Supp. 112, 114
(E.D.N.Y. 1950), afI'd, 186 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1951); and Phillips v. Oltarsh, 273
App. Div. 715, 717, 80 N.Y.S.2d 153, 155 (1968), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 835, 84 N.E.2d
146 (1949). The doctrine of res judicata requires that when one cause of action
has been adjudicated on the merits, the parties to that cause of action are bound by
the judgment rendered by the court and may not relitigate that same cause of action.
See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942). The doctrine of collateral estoppel
is only applied when the cause of action in the subsequent suit is different from that
asserted in the first proceeding, and it applies to issues of fact or law, rather than
to causes of action. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); The Ever-
greens v. Nunam, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944); Messing v. Barr Corp., 148 F.
Supp. 58 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
6. Accord, Cromwell v. County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351 (1876); Nichols v.
Alker, 231 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956); Neenan v.
Woodside Astoria Trans. Co., 261 N.Y. 159, 184 N.E. 744 (1933); Schuykill
Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 165 N.E. 456 (1929);
Westerfield v. Rogers, 174 N.Y. 230, 66 N.E. 813 (1903); Nelson v Brown, 144
N.Y. 384, 39 N.E. 355 (1895). See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942);
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 407 (5th rev. ed. 1925).
7. A number of exceptions to mutuality were allowed wherein derivative or
secondary liability was involved: (1) the indemnitor-indemnitee exception. See
Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. Ill (1912);
Elder v. New York & Pennsylvania Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d
188 (1940), Annot., 133 A.L.R. 181 (1941); Brobston v. Burgess, 290 Pa. 331, 138
A. 849 (1927); (2) the employer-employee exception. See Davis v. Perryman, 225
Ark. 963, 286 S.W.2d 844 (1956); Giedrewicz v. Donovan, 277 Mass. 563, 179
N.E. 246 (1932); Taylor v. Denton Hatchery, Inc., 251 N.C. 689, 111 S.E.2d 864
(1960); (3) the surety-principal debtor exception. See Kramer v. Morgan, 85 F.2d
96 (2d Cir. 1936); Lamb v. Wahlenmaier, 144 Cal. 91, 77 P. 765 (1904); Mon-
mouth Lumber Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 21 N.J. 439, 122 A.2d 604 (1956).
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action.8 Thus, by invoking "mutuality of estoppel," the courts limited the
effect of an in personam judgment to the parties before the court, and to
those nonparties in privity with them.9
The requirement of "mutuality of estoppel" has long been critized; as
early as 1828, Jeremy Bentham stated:
There is a reason for saying that a man shall not lose his cause in consequence
of the verdict given in a former proceeding to which he was not a party; but there
is no reason whatever for saying that he shall not lose his cause in consequence of
the verdict in a proceeding to which he was a party, merely because his adversary
was not. It is. . . the very height of absurdity.'o
It should be noted that Bentham's characterization of "mutuality of estop-
pel" as the "very height of absurdity"" has generally not been accepted
by the courts. Consequently, a significant number of jurisdictions still
adhere to the traditional interpretation of collateral estoppel. 12
However, in recent years a new definition of collateral estoppel has
begun to emerge. The first step in formulating this new definition was
taken by the California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Bank of America
National Trust & Saving Association.'8 In that case, the court held that a
judgment settling an executor's account, which determined that the de-
cedent had made a gift of a bank deposit to the executor, collaterally
estopped one of decedent's heirs-at-law from relitigating the issue of the
gift in a subsequent proceeding.' 4 Justice Traynor, writing for the court,
disposed of the requirement of "mutuality of estoppel" as follows:
Many courts have stated the facile formula that the plea . . . is available only
when there is privity and mutuality of estoppel . . . . No satisfactory rationaliza-
tion has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality . . . . In the present
8. See generally Seavey, Res Judicata with Reference to Persons neither Par-
ties nor Privities-Two California Cases, 57 HARV. L. REV. 98 (1943).
9. See generally Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments,
35 TuL. L. REV. 301 (1961).
10. 7 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (Bowring ed. 1843).
11. Id.
12. Illinois still adheres to the requirement of "mutuality of estoppel," re-
quiring the one employing the estoppel to be a party or in privity with a party to
the prior action. See Smith v. Bishop, 26 Ill. 2d 434, 187 N.E.2d 217 (1962);
Bentley v. Teton, 19 Ill. App. 2d 284, 153 N.E.2d 495 (1958); Rose v. Dolejs,
7 Ill. App. 2d 267, 129 N.E.2d 281 (1955). However a recent appellate level case,
Chidester v. Cagwin, 76 Ill. App. 2d 477, 222 N.E.2d 274 (1966), cited Bernhard
v. Bank of American Nat'l Trust & Saving Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942) [hereinafter cited as Bernhard], favorably and indicated that the court felt
that "mutuality of estoppel" was no longer needed for the application of collateral
estoppel in Illinois; See also Suggs v. Alabama Power Co., 271 Ala. 168, 123 So. 2d
4 (1960); Raz v. Mills, 233 Ore. 452, 378 P.2d 959 (1963); Owens v. Kuro, 56
Wash. 2d 564, 354 P.2d 696 (1960).
13. See supra note 12.
14. Bernhard, supra note 12, at 810, 122 P.2d at 894.
case, therefore, the defendant is not precluded by lack of privity or mutuality of
estoppel from asserting the plea .... 15
Thus, Justice Traynor disposed of the most widely recognized limitation
on the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel-"mutuality
of estoppel."
The ruling in Bernhard has been adopted in an increasing number of
jurisdictions. 16 Most recently, in Sanderson v. Balfour, 17 the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, in abandoning the requirement of "mutu-
ality of estoppel," stated: "The Bernhard decision initially caused hardly
a ripple in the sea of mutuality . . . . [Clommentators and courts have
now embraced its reasoning."' 8
Following the announcement of the "Bernhard Doctrine," the courts
adopted several limitations upon its use. The first limitation imposed on
the "Bernhard Doctrine" was that of "initiative;"' 19 that is, a party could
not be collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue in the present ac-
tion unless he had taken the initiative in bringing the prior law suit,
irrespective of the circumstances of the individual case. 20  The rationale
behind this limitation was that "an allowance of the plea should not re-
sult in a situation in which a number of initial plaintiffs lose, then one
wins, and the remainder win on the coattails of the first winner."'21
This limitation was soon abandoned. In Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v.
Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd.,22 for example, the plaintiff fur company sought
to recover on policies insuring against losses due to theft. The insur-
ance company invoked a prior judgment convicting Teitelbaum of staging
the robbery himself. Reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court of
California held that the defendant could use the judgment in the prior
criminal case. 23 The plaintiffs had specifically urged upon the court the
argument that one not a party to the prior action should be prohibited
from invoking the doctrine of collateral estoppel against a party who did
not have the initiative in the prior proceeding. Justice Traynor rejected
this argument:
15. Bernhard, supra note 12, at 811-12, 122 P.2d at 894-95.
16. See generally Curie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
25 (1965).
17. 109 N.H. 213, 247 A.2d 185 (1968).
18. Id. at -, 247 A.2d at 187.
19. See Curie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the "Bernhard"
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957).
20. Id. at 286.
21. Comment, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 63 Nw. L. REV. 209, 218
(1969).
22. 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439 (1962).
23. Id. at 604, 375 P.2d at 440.
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Although plaintiff's president did not have the initiative in his criminal trial, he was
afforded a full opportunity to litigate the issue of his guilt with all the safeguards
afforded the criminal defendant, and since he was charged with felonies punishable
in the state prison . . . he had every motive to make as vigorous and effective a
defense as possible.24
Hence, Teitelbaum establishes the proposition that a non-party to a prior
action may, in a subsequent proceeding, collaterally estop a party to the
former action from relitigating an issue decided therein, even though the
party to the prior action did not have the initiative in that suit.
The most significant limitation adopted by the courts in applying the
doctrine of collateral estoppel is that of limiting it to a defensive use.
This limitation is based on the proposition that an unsuccessful claimant
in a prior action, who has had his day in court, should not be able to reliti-
gate the same issues in subsequent proceedings by merely switching ad-
versaries. 25  Additionally, the courts rationalize the use of the doctrine
defensively, since allowing the plea by a non-party defendant removes
any possible advantage to claimants in not joining additional and obvious
defendants in the original action. The theory is that if the courts forbid
the use of the doctrine defensively, then the claimant would have a
tendency, especially in a doubtful case, to purposely avoid joining po-
tentially liable defendants. This proposition is based on the assumption
that a failure by a plaintiff to succeed against one defendant will not
prevent him from retrying his case against another.26 Hence, by allowing
the doctrine to be applied defensively, it would encourage an initial con-
solidation of the litigation and thereby reduce the number of cases pending
before the courts.
The defensive use of collateral estoppel by a non-party to a prior ac-
tion has been adopted in a significant number of jurisdictions.27 In
Mackey v. Frazier, 2 the South Carolina Supreme Court allowed the de-
24. Id. at 606-07, 375 P.2d at 441.
25. Bernhard, supra note 12; Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 6 W.W. Harr.
124, 36 Del. 124 (1934).
26. "In appropriate cases collateral estoppel might be applied against a party
who fails to take steps to unite litigation whenever jurisdictional boundaries and
other conditions permit." Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 571, 213 A.2d 26,
32 (1965).
27. Woodcock v. Udell, 48 Del. 69, 97 A.2d 878 (1953); De Polo v. Greig,
338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441 (1954); Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249,
72 N.W.2d 364 (1955); Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland, 249 N.C. 167, 105 S.E.
2d 655 (1958); Sanderson v. Balfour, supra note 17; Cover v. Platte Valley Pub.
Power & Irrigation Dist., 162 Neb. 146, 75 N.W.2d 661 (1956); Shimke v. Earley,
173 Ohio St. 521, 184 N.E.2d 209 (1962); Helmig v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 389 Pa. 21,
131 A.2d 622 (1957); Harding v. Carr, 79 R.I. 32, 83 A.2d 79 (1951); Mackey v.
Frazier, 234 S.C. 81, 106 S.E.2d 895 (1959).
28. 234 S.C. 81, 106 S.E.2d 895 (1959).
[Vol. XIX414 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
fendant to defensively apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent
the plaintiff, who had been found negligent in a prior suit, from relitigating
the issue of negligence in the present action. In Shimke v. Earley,29
the Supreme Court of Ohio allowed the defendant to assert the doctrine
although in a prior action the plaintiff in the present suit was found
negligent in the operation of his vehicle. As a result, he was collaterally
estopped from relitigating the issue of his negligence in the present action.
One of the most recent jurisdictions to allow the defensive use of the
doctrine was New Hampshire in the decision of Sanderson v. Balfour.30
In a prior action, the owner of an auto, which had been parked by his
wife on a highway, successfully recovered for property damage against
a tractor driver who had struck the auto. In Balfour, the tractor driver
brought a suit for personal injury against the owner's wife. The court,
relying on the prior action, allowed the wife to assert collateral estoppel
as to the tractor driver's negligence. 3 '
While a number of state courts have allowed the doctrine to be applied
defensively, they have rejected its use in an affirmative manner. This
appears to be the view of the vast majority of jurisdictions in the United
States.82 The most noteworthy example of a state's reluctance to apply
the doctrine affirmatively in a multiple claimant situation can be found
in California-the same jurisdiction which decided Bernhard. In Nev-
arov v. Caldwell,33 the court was squarely presented with the issue of
whether the literal language of Bernhard was intended to be applied
affirmatively to multiple litigant situations.8 4 In a prior suit by an infant,
the defendant in Nevarov had been found negligent in causing a multi-
vehicle accident. In Nevarov, the infant's parents sued the defendant and
claimed that the prior judgment conclusively established, in their favor, the
issue of defendant's negligence. The court rejected this plea:
[Tihe application of the rule . . . to multiple claims . . . against a single defendant
29. 173 Ohio St. 521, 184 N.E.2d 209 (1962).
30. Supra note 17.
31. New Hampshire is the most recent jurisdiction to abandon the require-
ment of "mutuality of estoppel" and adopt the Bernhard rule.
32. See generally The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Col-
lateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967); Mutuality of
Estoppel: McCourt v. Algiers in Context, 1967 Wis. L. REV. -
33. 327 P.2d 111 (Cal. App. 1958).
34. Justice Traynor replaced the requirement of "mutuality of estoppel" with a
three-fold test: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical
with the issue presented in the action in question; (2) there must have been a final
judgment on the merits in the prior action; and (3) the party against whom the
plea is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudi-
cation. This test has become known as the "Bernhard Doctrine." Bernhard, supra
note 12, at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
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or set of defendants growing out of a single accident . . . does not apply....
[Sluch an extension of the doctrine would be promotive of litigation and subversion
of sound principles of judicial administration looking to equal justice for all.88
The Arizona decision of Spettigue v. Mahoneys6is another example of
a court's reluctance to allow collateral estoppel to be applied affirmatively
in a multiple litigant situation. In a prior action, the court determined
that the state was negligent in the construction and maintenance of a
bridge on a public highway.87 The plaintiff in Spettigue sought to col-
laterally estop the state from relitigating the question of its negligence.
In rejecting the affirmative application of the doctrine, the court stated:
We are reluctant to adopt a rule which would incline a plaintiff to maneuver to
advance on the calendar another plaintiff's case with more jury-appeal rather than
to seek consolidation with other plaintiffs to determine liability. 8
Although state courts have refused to allow a non-party to the prior
action to affirmatively assert the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a number
of federal courts have allowed its application in this situation. One of
the most important decisions is United States v. United Air Lines, Inc.8 9
That case involved the collision over Nevada of a United Air Lines
passenger plane with a U.S.A.F. jet, killing all forty-two passengers and
five crew members of the private plane and the two Air Force pilots.
Suits by survivors of the deceased passengers were brought in eleven dif-
ferent jurisdictions. 40 The first suit to be tried to a conclusion was in a
California Federal District Court and resulted in a verdict for plaintiffs
on the issue of the airline's negligence. The plaintiffs in Washington at
first contemplated a transfer of their case to the California District Court.
However, they later decided to move for summary judgment on the
theory that the California judgment was conclusive on the issue of lia-
bility and defendant was collaterally estopped from denying its negli-
gence. 41  District Judge Hall granted the plaintiff's motion, rejecting the
35. Supra note 33, at 119. Accord, McDougall v. Palo Alto Unified School
District, 212 Cal. App. 2d 422, 28 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1963); Price v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. R.R., 164 Cal. App. 2d 400, 330 P.2d 933 (1958); see WEST's ANN. CALIF. CODE
CIV. PROC. § 1908 subd. 2 (West 1955).
36. 8 Ariz. App. 281, 445 P.2d 557 (1968).
37. Id. at -, 445 P.2d at 558.
38. Id. at -, 445 P.2d at 564. In support of the court's position, see lB
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.412, at 1803-14 (1965); Annots., 133 A.L.R. 181,
185 (1941), 23 A.L.R.2d 710, 717 (1952); 30a AM. JUR. Judgments § 392m
(1958); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 765 (1947).
39. 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. 1962), aff'd sub. nom. as to res judicata and
mutuality, United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. dis-
missed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
40. Suits were filed in United States District Courts in California, Colorado,
Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Nevada, New York,
and Washington.
41. Supra note 16, at 35.
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argument of defendant that the doctrine could not be asserted in cases
where there was not privity of both parties to the prior action. He stated:
Ilt is true that the general rule requires that there be identity of parties . . . never-
theless, the Court, increasingly so in the last 20 years, have not adhered to that doc-
. .- ". , -.- ''--'-- violated where the thing to be
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States District Court in Maryland, relying on the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, granted a motion for summary judgment in an airplane crash
case. The first action resulting from this crash to be tried to a conclu-
sion was in the District of Columbia.50 In that action, the United States
was held liable for the negligence of tower controllers in failing to warn a
Capital Airlines Viscount of the proximity of another aircraft with which
it ultimately collided. The court in Gliedman allowed the plaintiff to
affirmatively apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent the air-
line from relitigating the issue of negligence. The plaintiff in the Glied-
man case was careful to point out that the Government had had its "day in
court." There had been extensive depositions, interrogatories, and a
complete trial on the issue, with witnesses presented on both sides under
conditions of full examination and cross-examination. Consequently,
there was no reason for that issue to be tried again.51 The court agreed
with plaintiff's contention:
There seem to be no compelling reasons for requiring that the party asserting the
plea of collateral estoppel, even affirmatively as in this case, must have been a party,
or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation . . . . Indeed, the philosophical
basis for the doctrine of collateral estoppel is that a party . . . should not be able
to litigate that issue ad nauseam .... 52
Thus, Gliedman establishes the proposition that where a defendant has
had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issues in a prior action,
there is no reason for allowing him to relitigate them in a subsequent
proceeding.55
The "federal rule" of "full and fair opportunity" encompasses the fol-
lowing criteria: (1) that the party sought to be estopped has had an ade-
quate opportunity to gather and present depositions and interrogatories
in the prior action; 54 (2) that the party sought to be estopped has had
the opportunity to call witnesses and to cross-examine his adversaries'
witnesses;55 (3) that the prior action was a fair adversary proceeding
free from prejudice;56 and (4) that there was a final determination on
the issue which the party is estopped from relitigating in the subsequent
action.57
In DeWitt v. Hall,58 the New York Court of Appeals took the initial
50. Maryland ex rel. Meyer v. United States, 322 F.2d 1009, aff'd on the issue of
agency and remanded, United States v. Maryland ex rel. Meyer, 382 U.S. 158 (1965).
51. Supra note 49, at 301.
52. Supra note 49, at 303-04.
53. See supra note 49, at 303.
54. See supra note 39, at 725-26; supra note 49, at 303.
55. See supra note 39, at 728; supra note 49, at 303.
56. See supra note 39, at 728; supra note 49, at 303-04.
57. See supra note 39, at 717; supra note 49, at 303.
58. 19 N.W.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
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step necessary for the adoption of the "federal rule." The plaintiff's
truck, while driven by an employee, collided with defendant Hall's car.
In a prior lawsuit, the employee sued Hall and obtained a judgment for
personal injuries. In DeWitt, the employer sued for property damages
and asserted that his employee's prior judgment estopped Hall from re-
litigating the issue of negligence. The court permitted DeWitt to af-
firmatively use the prior judgment,59 even though he was not a party to
that action and would not have been estopped by that judgment. The
court's view was that DeWitt was entitled to collaterally estop Hall be-
cause there was no policy or precedent to prevent the affirmative use of
a prior judgment to bar a defendant from relitigating the issue of negli-
gence.60
DeWitt is often cited as authorizing the affirmative use of collateral
estoppel in a multiple litigant situation by a non-party to the prior action.
This is only partially correct. While allowing the doctrine to be applied
affirmatively, the DeWitt case restricts the application to the very limited
fact situation
Where the plaintiff in the present action, the owner of the vehicle, derives his
right to recovery from the plaintiff in the first action, [and] the operator of said
vehicle . . . [does] not technically stand in the relationship of privity .... 61
Thus, the court requires that the cause of action of the party asserting the
plea of collateral estoppel be derivative from the right of the party who
successfully recovered the prior judgment.
Having allowed the affirmative use of collateral estoppel in DeWitt,
the New York courts proceeded to develop a new test for the application
of collateral estoppel. In Schwartz v. Public Administrator of County
of Bronx,"2 the New York Court of Appeals formulated a new criterion
as to when the doctrine can be asserted. In a prior action by a pas-
senger, both parties in Schwartz were found negligent in the operation of
their trucks. In Schwartz, the driver of one of the trucks brought an ac-
tion against the other driver to recover damages to his vehicle.63  The
defendant in Schwartz sought a summary judgment based on the theory
that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from denying his own negli-
59. Id. at 147, 225 N.E.2d at 198, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
60. Id. at 147, 225 N.E.2d at 198, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 602. The court disposed
of defendant's contention that the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel
required "mutuality of estoppel" by stating that "the doctrine of mutuality is a dead
letter." Id. at 147, 225 N.E.2d at 198, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
61. Id. at 148, 225 N.E.2d at 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 602 (emphasis added).
62. 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969).
63. Id. at 69, 246 N.E.2d at 730.
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gence. 64 The court granted the motion65 and stated that the only re-
quirements necessary to assert the doctrine of collateral estoppel are:
[A]n identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and
is decisive of the present action, and, second, there must have been a full and fair
opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling.66
Thus, Schwartz adopts the "federal rule" of "full and fair opportunity."
Therefore, at the time the Hart decision was reached, the New York
courts had allowed the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be applied af-
firmatively where the party asserting the doctrine had derived his rights
from a party to the prior action. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals an-
nounced a new test for the application of the doctrine, which can be
stated as follows:
Where a full opportunity has been afforded to a party to the prior action and
he has failed to prove his freedom from liability or to establish liability or culpa-
bility on the part of another, there is no reason for permitting him to retry these
issues.67
The decision in Hart applied the test formulated in Schwartz6" and al-
lowed the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be affirmatively applied in a
multiple litigant situation by a person neither a party to, nor deriving
rights from a party to the prior action. The effect of this decision is
similar to that of a compulsory joinder, in that from defendant's point of
view, once the issue is decided against him, he is prohibited from relitigat-
ing it in a subsequent action.
In Hart the defendant argued that allowing the plaintiff to invoke col-
lateral estoppel on the basis of the Texas judgment was in violation of the
"full faith and credit" clause of the United States Constitution 9 because
it allows one state to give a greater effect to the judgment rendered by a
court of a sister state. The purpose of the "full faith and credit" clause is
to prevent a party in another state from collaterally attacking and at-
64. The plaintiff's attorney, in attempting to prevent the defendant from assert-
ing the doctrine, raised the issue that the parties to the present action were not
adversaries in the prior action. Plaintiff relied on Galser v. Huette, 232 App.
Div. 119, 249 N.Y.S. 374, aff'd 256 N.Y. 686, 177 N.E. 193 (1931), which held
that a judgment in favor of a passenger in an action against the operators of two
colliding vehicles does not give rise to an estoppel which would bar a subsequent
action by one of the drivers against the action by one of the drivers against the
other for his own personal injuries or property damage. The court dismissed the
plaintiff's argument by stating that decisions in recent years have made this distinc-
tion, "an insignificant if not irrelevant one." Supra note 62, at 71, 246 N.E.2d
at 729.
65. Supra note 62, at 76, 246 N.E.2d at 732.
66. Supra note 62, at 71, 246 N.E.2d at 729.
67. Hart v. American Airlines Inc., supra note 3, at 814, 61 Misc. 2d at -.
68. Hart v. American Airlines Inc., supra note 3, at 812, 61 Misc. 2d at -.
69. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
tempting to impeach a valid judgment of a court which had jurisdiction
over all parties. 70  There is, however, no constitutional requirement that
the effect given to a prior judgment by the forum must always accord with
the effect given in the state rendering the judgment. The "full faith and
credit" clause does not require such a rigid test. As long as the effect of
the judgment, as between the parties, is accorded equal respect, the con-
stitutional requirement is fulfilled. 71  The court in Hart rejected de-
fendant's contention on the ground that the Texas judgment was not
sought to be enforced, but was only sought to be used in an evidentiary
manner in relation to a particular issue. The court stated:
What is here involved is a policy determination by our courts that "one who has
had his day in court should not be permitted to litigate the question anew" . .. ,
and, further, refused, "to tolerate a condition where, on relatively the same set of
facts, one fact-finder, be it court or jury" may find a party liable while another
exonerates him leading to the "inconsistent results which are always a blemish on a
judicial system." 72
Hence, the court dismissed defendant's argument that the affirmative ap-
plication of collateral estoppel in multiple litigant situations, would violate
the "full faith and credit" clause of the United States Constitution.78
Defendant, having failed in attempting to convince the court that the
application of collateral estoppel would violate the "full faith and credit"
clause, advanced the argument that determination of liability in Texas
"may be an aberration stemming from local prejudice against corporate
defendants or from sympathy considerations. ' 74  The court rejected this
argument, viewing it as "conjectural musings" which were not supported
by the evidence. 75 , Had the defendant supported his charges with proper
evidence of prejudice, the court would have had to deny the application
of collateral estoppel. This denial would be a logical application of the
test formulated in Schwartz because the requirement of "fairness"
would not be met. However, the party objecting to the application of
the doctrine has the burden of proving that he did not have a "full and
70. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
71 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943). In support of
this argument defendant cited United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607 (3d Cir.
1948) cert. denied, 335 U.S. 825 (1948), and Everett v. Everett, 215 U.S. 203
(1909); these actions, unlike the situation in Hart, involved an issue litigated by
the same parties in both actions. The court, therefore, precluded plaintiff from
reasserting its cause of action. These cases were res judicata situations. In support
of the court's position, see Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129
(1959).
72. Supra note 68, at 814, 61 Misc. 2d at -.
73. Supra note 69.
74. Supra note 68, at 814, 61 Misc. 2d at -.
75. Supra note 68, at 814, 61 Misc, 2d at-,
1969] CASE NOTES
fair opportunity" to defend in the prior action.76 The defendant in Hart
failed to meet this burden, and hence, the court allowed the plea of col-
lateral estoppel.
The defendant in Hart also contended that the law of Texas, which re-
quired mutuality,77 should be applied in the case. The court rejected
defendant's argument stating:
The state of Texas has no legitimate interest in imposing its rules on collateral
estoppel upon these New York residents and a holding that permits such result
would, . . . constitute . . 'anachronistic treatment' .*...78
Thus, the court felt that in order for Texas law to govern, Texas would
have to have an interest in the litigation, which it did not have in the
Hart case.
The defendant also argued that estoppel should not be applied because
the jury in Texas did not know that its verdict would affect parties
other than those to the suit.7 9 If the defendant's contention were upheld,
the defendant would be entitled to a jury instruction that the determina-
tion of the jury on a given issue of fact might be binding, as against de-
fendant, in subsequent actions brought by plaintiffs not parties to the
present suit. The court dismissed this argument as "grasping at straws,"80
since in the court's view the issue was the same in both actions and the
number of parties was not relevant to the airline's negligence.81
The remainder of this case note will examine possible future applica-
tions of the Hart rule and discuss some of the problems created by this
decision.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is particularly adaptable to airline
crashes.8 2 Every passenger on an aircraft is in the same legal position
as his fellow passengers. He is a passive rider and, therefore, no issue of
contributory negligence can arise. The evidence and the defense to the
merits utilized by the defendant arise out of the same set of facts. Once
the defendant has had a full opportunity to defend against the claim of
one passenger and has been found liable, the remaining passengers will
76. Supra note 68, at 812-13, 61 Misc. 2d at -. Supra note 62, at 73, 246
N.E.2d at 731.
77. "After a question of law or an issue of fact has been litigated and adjudi-
cated in a court of competent jurisdiction, the same natter cannot be relitigated in a
subsequent suit between the same parties or those in privity with them." Swilley v.
McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1964) (emphasis added).
78. Supra note 68, at 813, 61 Misc. at -.
79. Supra note 68, at 815, 61 Misc. 2d at -.
80. Supra note 68, at 815, 61 Misc. 2d at -.
81. Supra note 68, at 815, 61 Misc. 2d at -.
82. See generally Wolcott, Collateral Estoppel and other Practical Approaches
to Commercial Air Crash Claims, 13 N.Y.L.F. 509 (1967).
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have no difficulty in showing an identity of issue.
Admittedly, the application of the doctrine is more complex when
dealing with auto accidents because of the question of contributory negli-
gence. However, this problem can be avoided by allowing the applica-
tion of estoppel as to defendant's negligence and having the question of
contributory negligence subsequently litigated.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel can also be applied to multiple
litigant situations in products liability litigation. For example, if in the
initial action it can be shown that the defective component was an under-
sized bolt, and the same size bolt was used in manufacturing all of the
products in question, there would be no reason to require subsequent
plaintiffs to relitigate the issue of whether or not the bolt used was the
proper size for the use intended.
The court in Hart felt that the exoneration of the defendant in a sub-
sequent suit would be a "blemish on a judicial system."'8 3  For the most
part, inconsistent decisions by different courts on the same facts are
a "blemish" on a court system. However, there are times when the
"blemish" is the "just" decision. Consider, for example, the fact that the
defendant might have been represented in the prior suit by an incom-
petent attorney, or the attorney, based on incompetency or mistaken
judgment, failed to properly preserve a question for appeal. Are these
sufficient reasons for defendant to lose all subsequent actions involving
the same facts? This is a disadvantage to the doctrine which must be
considered by the courts when deciding whether or not to allow the appli-
cation of the doctrine affirmatively by non-parties in multiple litigant
situations.
However, the defendant is not left entirely without "safeguards" for
his protection. The defendant can defeat plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment based on collateral estoppel, by employing either or both of
two methods. The first method open to defendant is to collaterally attack
the judgment in the prior action, thereby destroying its validity as a basis
for the estoppel. Secondly, the defendant may prove in the subsequent
action that he did not receive a "full and fair opportunity" in the prior
litigation. The only disadvantage to the defendant in the second method
is that he must maintain the burden of proof.8 4
A possible alternative to applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel
in a multiple litigant situation was suggested by an Illinois Appellate Court
in Smith v. Andrews.s 5 In that case, the court permitted the plaintiffs
83. Supra note 72.
84. Supra note 76.
85. 54 Ill. App. 2d 51, 203 N.E.2d 160 (1965).
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to introduce as prima acie evidence court records pertaining to defend-
ant's past criminal convictions to show his unfitness as a parent in an
adoption proceeding. The courts, therefore, as an alternative to pre-
cluding re-litigation of the issue, could allow the prior adjudication to
be admitted as prima facie evidence and thereby shift the burden to de-
fendant, rather than the more severe consequence of preclusion involved
in collateral estoppel.
Another alternative to the affirmative use of collateral estoppel would
be a compulsory joinder of all claimants in multiple litigant situations.
The compulsory joinder would make all claimants "necessary" parties
and the court would not proceed until all were joined.86
The greatest benefit from the affirmative application of collateral
estoppel in multiple litigant situations will be derived by the general
public. The Creasy case took nineteen days to try; no doubt it would
have taken at least another nineteen days to try the Hart case. By ap-
plying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the only trial time necessary
would be to determine damages. In an age where a six year wait for a
jury trial is a rule rather than an exception, the courts should adopt a
liberal attitude toward the use of collateral estoppel.
In conclusion, the rationale behind the doctrine of collateral estoppel
is a "rule of reason and practical necessity. '87 The reasons for allowing
the doctrine to be applied affirmatively do not differ substantially from
those put forward in justifing the defensive use of the doctrine. Both the
affirmative and defensive application of collateral estoppel in multiple
litigant situations are based on the rationale that a party should not be
able to re-litigate issues by merely switching adversaries. Both lead to
a policy of joining all parties in one action.
The Hart case is but a logical extension of the "Bernhard Doctrine"
and, more particularly, case law in New York. The "Bernhard Doc-
trine" as announced by Justice Traynor, did not limit itself to a defensive
use, but the courts saw fit to interpret it in that light. In DeWitt, the
New York courts allowed the affirmative application of collateral estop-
pel in limited fact situations, and in Schwartz they adopted the "full and
fair opportunity" test. The Hart case merely extended the decisions of
DeWitt and Schwartz to further the objective of our court system: to
give the parties a "full and fair opportunity" to present their case and
not to allow a party to relitigate an issue "ad nauseam." Does the af-
firmative application of collateral estoppel in multiple litigant situations
86. See FED. R. Cr.. P. 19.
87. Good Health Dairy Prod. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 18, 9 N.E.2d 758,, 759
(1937).
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achieve this objective or does the ultimate solution lie in compulsory
joinder? Although this question remains unanswered, the Hart decision
is a step toward finding an adequate solution.
Chet Maciorowski
